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ABSTRACT
After the positive vibrations that the Arab Spring sent around Europe 
in 2011, today we are witnessing a reversal of that positive trend. The 
escalation of violence and insecurity in the region is sending shock 
waves across Europe and North America. Negative vibrations have 
been acutely felt in Europe, not only with the Charlie Hebdo events 
in Paris, but also in relation to the so-called foreign fighters question. 
Several thousand young people –mostly men but also women–, 
a tiny, albeit dramatically visible, part of the European Muslim 
community –some of whom are second-generation migrant youth 
of Muslim origin, while others are young converts– have joined ISIS 
forces in Syria to fight a jihadist war. My aim in this paper is to argue 
that, while the weaknesses and tensions of integration policies exist 
and may have intensified since the start of the new century, the seeds 
of minority Muslim youth recruitment in Europe has more to do with 
today’s global-local connections rather than with failed integration.
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European Muslims: 
Caught between Local Integration Challenges 
and Global Terrorism Discourses
by Anna Triandafyllidou*
Introduction
After the positive vibrations that the Arab Spring sent around Europe in 2011 with 
the peaceful but intense grassroots activity in Egypt, Tunisia, but also Syria, and 
the rebellion against Gheddafi in Libya, today we are witnessing a near complete 
reversal of that positive trend. In Egypt the democratic revolution has failed, Libya 
and Syria are on the verge of collapsing, and the whole Middle East is imploding. The 
only Arab spring country that seems to be surviving the test of democratic reform 
is Tunisia. Jihadist terrorism as professed by ISIS and its followers has recently 
attacked both the military-ruled Egypt through the execution of 21 Egyptian 
Christian workers in Libya and the democratic and moderately Islamist Tunisia 
with the attack on the Badhou Museum in Tunis in March 2015. This escalation of 
violence and insecurity in the region is sending shock waves across Europe and 
North America, leading to various coalitions to help Syria, Iraq, the Gulf States and 
Saudi Arabia to combat terrorism and ISIS.
Negative vibrations have been acutely felt in Europe, not only in the killing of the 
entire editorial team of the Charlie Hebdo left-wing satirical magazine by three 
Islamic extremists in early January 2015 in Paris, but also in the so-called foreign 
fighters question. Several thousand young people (mostly men but also women), 
a tiny, albeit dramatically visible, part of the European Muslim community (some 
of whom are second-generation migrant youth of Muslim origin, while others are 
young converts) have joined ISIS forces in Syria to fight a jihadist war. In September 
2014 it was estimated that there were 2,000 foreign fighters from Western states, 
but recent reports estimate 3,500 within a total of approximately 19,000 foreign 
fighters from all over the world (see also Figure 1 below).1
1 Kukil Bora, “ISIS Continues Steady Recruitment As 20,000 Foreign Fighters Join Extremist 
Groups In Syria, Iraq”, in International Business Times, 11 February 2015, http://www.ibtimes.com/
node/1812440.
* Anna Triandafyllidou is Professor at the Global Governance Programme (GGP) of the Robert 
Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies (RSCAS), European University Institute. Within the GGP she 
coordinates the Research Area on Cultural Pluralism.
. Paper produced within the framework of the New-Med Research Network, May 2015.
IA
I 
W
O
R
K
IN
G
 P
A
P
E
R
S
 1
5
 |
 1
5
 -
 M
A
Y
 2
0
15
3
©
 2
0
15
 I
A
I
European Muslims: Caught between Local Integration Challenges 
and Global Terrorism Discourses
IS
S
N
 2
2
8
0
-4
3
4
1 
| I
S
B
N
 9
78
-8
8
-9
8
6
5
0
-3
9
-2
Data: French Interior Ministry, British Government, Belgian Government, Austrian Interior Ministry, 
US government, Australian government, The International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and 
Political Violence, Reuters, France24, Deutsche Welle, The Local Sweden, Sveriges Radio.
Source: Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, http://public.tableau.com/shared/7KY76J2DZ.
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Much has been said since the summer of 2014 about how the recruitment of these 
young people by extremist imams or directly through the internet testifies to the 
failure of the different models of migrant integration in Europe. Furthermore, 
several media reports and popular wisdom have suggested that the behaviour of 
these youngsters reveals a failed integration process, leaving a second generation 
that feels foreign in its country of birth and quintessentially Muslim, extremist and 
illiberal despite all the so-called good efforts of the institutions of the receiving 
countries to incorporate them into society and in the labour market.
Second-generation Turkish youth in Germany and the Netherlands, Maghrebins in 
France and Bangladeshis and Pakistanis in Britain do less well than native and other 
migrant youth in terms of educational attainment and labour market integration. 
They often abandon school or professional training before completion and have 
higher than average rates of unemployment. While this does not necessarily 
indicate an inability to integrate – but, rather, points to important aspects of 
discrimination, what Heath and Cheung have aptly called the “ethnic penalty”2 – 
this trend is often portrayed in the media as a “proof” of the failure of Muslims to 
adapt to Western liberal free market democracies.
My aim in this paper is to argue that, while the weaknesses and tensions of 
integration policies exist and may have intensified since the start of the new 
century, the seeds of minority Muslim youth recruitment in Europe has more to do 
with today’s global-local connections rather than with failed integration.
It goes beyond the scope of this paper to discuss how these fighters are recruited 
as foreign fighters and, in particular, as terrorists. I start with a critical survey of the 
integration policies of different European countries with large Muslim populations 
and discuss their tensions and weak spots. I then point to the increasing connectivity 
that characterises today’s world and the ways in which such connectivity projects 
local tensions to global conflicts, preventing local actors from seeing their local 
or national solutions and also creating an overall negative climate fed by global 
terrorism which prevents a local focus that would be more beneficial to local 
problems.
1. European Muslims
Muslims are the largest immigrant (non-indigenous) group in Europe, a fact that has 
raised important challenges for ethnic, cultural and religious diversity. European 
Muslims cannot of course be considered as a uniform group in any respect, as they 
come from different countries, live in different countries, speak different languages, 
adhere to different versions of Islam, are more or less moderate in their beliefs and 
2 Anthony F. Heath and Sin Yi Cheung (eds.), Unequal Chances. Ethnic Minorities in Western 
Labour Markets, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2007.
IA
I 
W
O
R
K
IN
G
 P
A
P
E
R
S
 1
5
 |
 1
5
 -
 M
A
Y
 2
0
15
5
©
 2
0
15
 I
A
I
European Muslims: Caught between Local Integration Challenges 
and Global Terrorism Discourses
IS
S
N
 2
2
8
0
-4
3
4
1 
| I
S
B
N
 9
78
-8
8
-9
8
6
5
0
-3
9
-2
claims.3 Despite these multi-level differences within the Muslim communities of 
Europe, Muslims are often portrayed in the media and policy discourses as a single 
community, as a population that shares common traits and that can be dealt with by 
the same type of policies – or indeed that cannot be integrated into or assimilated 
by for the same type of reasons.4
Since the 1990s there has been a tendency across Europe to label immigrants 
in religious terms rather than in the light of their ethno-cultural background or 
social roles in society. This tendency, whereby Muslims in particular are seldom 
categorised as Turks, Moroccans or Pakistanis (or as students or workers), holds 
in several European countries, where debates over integration and toleration of 
differences invariably centre on Muslims, and where religion is often associated 
with potential conflict. Public discussions tend to take place in an “us-them” 
framework: Islam is increasingly constructed in opposition to Western (British, 
Dutch, Swedish, Spanish, French, Italian and so on) values of democracy and 
equality.
The countries with the largest Muslim populations in Europe are Germany (3.8-4.3 
million), France (estimated at 5 million), the UK (1.6 million), the Netherlands (1.1 
million), Italy (1 million), Bulgaria (1 million), Spain (0.7 million), Greece (0.5 million) 
and Sweden (0.35 million).5 These numbers are estimates based on data from the 
countries of origin and include both first- and second-generation migrants; there are 
no European official religious statistics. In Bulgaria Muslims are a native historical 
minority. The first Muslim communities settled in Bulgaria in the 14th century. 
Apart from Turks and Tatars, who are almost exclusively Muslim, numerous ethnic 
Bulgarians and Roma also belong to the Bulgarian Muslim community. Similarly, 
the estimated 85,000 Muslims who live in north-eastern Greece, in the region of 
western Thrace, are mainly of Turkish and Roma ethnicity. Most other Muslim 
populations in Europe are of immigrant origin. In the UK and France they are linked 
to pre-existing colonial ties and the decolonisation process in North Africa and 
Southeast Asia. In Germany, the Netherlands, Italy, Spain, Greece and Sweden, on 
the other hand, Muslims came as economic migrants without any previous special 
relationship between the country of origin and the country of destination.
In terms of nationality the vast majority of Germany’s Muslims are Turks (or of 
Turkish origin). French Muslims are mainly of Moroccan, Algerian and Tunisian 
origin. British Muslims are South-East Asians for the most part, in particular 
Pakistanis and Bangladeshis. In the Netherlands the largest Muslim populations 
are Turkish and Moroccan. In Italy and Spain the vast majority of Muslim residents 
are of North African origin (Moroccans predominantly). In Greece, and also to 
some extent in Italy (in addition to the Moroccans), Muslims are mainly South-East 
3 Anna Triandafyllidou (ed.), Muslims in 21st Century Europe. Structural and Cultural Perspectives, 
London and New York, Routledge, 2010.
4 For a more detailed discussion of Muslims in Europe see Ibid., p. 1-27.
5 Ibid., p. 13.
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Asians (Pakistanis, Bangladeshis, Afghanis and Somalis). In Sweden, Muslims are 
mainly asylum seekers from Somalia, Iran, Iraq and Bosnia.
In Britain, France, the Netherlands and Germany Muslim immigrants began to 
arrive in the 1960s. After the 1970s and the 1973 oil crisis these countries put a 
stop to primary economic immigration; however, secondary (family reunification 
and family formation) migratory inflows have continued to this day. In Italy, Spain 
and Greece Muslim immigrants first arrived after 1989, when as these countries 
emerged as poles of attraction for economic migrants. Contrary to the cases of 
Britain, France, the Netherlands and Germany, where primary immigration took 
place largely legally and sometimes as part of bilateral agreements (for instance 
between Turkey and Germany), the newly arrived Muslims in southern Europe 
mostly came illegally. They managed, however, to regularise their status (like all 
other immigrants in these countries) and to settle down.
2. Tensions over Islam in different European countries
In France, where religion is seen as a private matter and where public space is 
thought of as secular, Muslims are constructed as “different” from other native 
French because of their religion and ethnicity, including even their physical 
features (darker skin). However, in a situation where religious belonging is seldom 
used as a basis for political mobilisation, it is more common to hear members of 
minorities who trace their ancestry to North Africa described as “maghrebins” rather 
than as “French Muslims.” Islam in France is thus constructed as an ethnic marker 
that encompasses a religious dimension.6 Muslims in France can be considered 
a “visible” minority and are discriminated against in employment, housing and 
social service, much as coloured people are. However, since ethnic statistics are a 
contentious issue in France, there are no official statistics that can appropriately 
document these phenomena.7
Muslims in France pose a specific challenge to the dominant concept of laïcité. 
Concretely, laïcité is the complete separation of church and state and represents 
an institutional arrangement that sets the conditions for the exercise of religion 
and the limits of religious forms of expression. This is a specific feature of the 
French case, although in most other European countries Muslims, and their claims, 
challenge the limits of the moderately secular democratic national and European 
institutions.
6 Valérie Amiraux, “From Empire to Republic: the French Muslim Dilemma”, in Anna 
Triandafyllidou (ed.), Muslims in 21st Century Europe, cit., p. 137-159, http://valerieamiraux.com/
wp-content/uploads/2010/11/from-empire-to-republic-the-french-muslim-dilemma.pdf.
7 Patrick Simon, “The Choice of Ignorance. The Debate on Ethnic and Racial Statistics in France”, 
in French Politics, Culture and Society, Vol. 26, No. 1 (Spring 2008), p. 7-31.
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In Germany Muslims were previously generally referred to as Turks, that 
is, according to their nationality or ethnicity. It was only in the 1990s, and 
increasingly in the 2000s, that Turks became “Muslims” and that the public debate 
on immigrant integration centred on the notion of a common German “leading 
culture” (Leitkultur). Proposed by a conservative politician, Friedrich Merz, the idea 
of the German Leitkultur demanded that immigrants adapt to this leading culture 
if they want to stay in Germany for good. Thus, the socio-economic dimension of 
the problems of Turkish/Muslim migrant integration in German society was set 
aside, and integration challenges were increasingly seen as issues of culture and 
religion – especially after 9/11.
This culturalising of social problems (which attributed all contested issues such as 
arranged/forced marriages or homophobia to the religious beliefs and identity of 
the group) contributed to the stigmatisation of all Muslims in Germany, regardless 
of their personal beliefs, and to the politicisation of these issues.8 Especially since 
the relaxation of the naturalisation provisions in Germany in 2000, there has been 
a simultaneous reactionary turn towards scrutinising whether Turkish citizens, 
even those established in Germany for decades, espouse the principal German 
values or constitute some kind of suspect and dangerous “other” in the midst of the 
German nation.9 In this context, the term “tolerance” became particularly relevant, 
as Muslims were seen as asking for tolerance of their difference, while they were 
themselves supposedly intolerant of the German national majority and/or their 
own members who held dissenting views. In Germany there was a clear shift – 
from the 1990s when it was mainly right-wing extremists who were considered 
intolerant in society, to the post-2001 years when it is the Muslims who are the 
“intolerant” ones.
The public discourse in Germany, which also rages widely in Denmark and the 
Netherlands, ignores the fact that in Germany, for instance, Turks and people with 
a Turkish background are not the only Muslim groups – and many of them are 
not practising Muslims or not Muslims at all. The Muslim populations of European 
countries are ethnically diverse although the level of such ethnic diversity varies 
among countries. Thus in France, Britain, Germany, the Netherlands, Italy and 
Spain there are some ethnic groups that numerically predominate (Moroccans, 
Algerians and Tunisians in France, Pakistani and Bangladeshi in Britain, Turks 
in Germany, Turks and Moroccans in the Netherlands, Moroccans and Tunisians 
in Italy and Spain). Other European countries have Muslim communities that are 
highly diverse in terms of ethnic origin. For instance, Sweden has one of the most 
heterogeneous Muslim populations of all Western European countries. They have 
8 Ruth Mandel, Cosmopolitan Anxieties. Turkish Challenges to Citizenship and Belonging in 
Germany, Durham, Duke University Press, 2008; Gökçe Yurdakul, From Guest Workers into 
Muslims. The Transformation of Turkish Immigrant Associations in Germany, Newcastle upon 
Tyne, Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2009.
9 Werner Schiffauer, “Enemies Within the Gates: The Debate about the Citizenship of Muslims in 
Germany”, in Tariq Modood, Anna Triandafyllidou, Ricard Zapata-Barrero (eds.), Multiculturalism, 
Muslims and Citizenship. A European Approach, London and New York, Routledge, 2005, p. 94-116.
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different ethnic, political, linguistic and/or educational backgrounds and come 
from over forty different countries in north and sub-Saharan Africa; from Arabic, 
Turkish or Persian parts of Asia, and from Europe. They come from secularised 
states such as Turkey, religious states such as Iran, and from former socialist states 
such as Bosnia-Herzegovina and several of the new states that formerly belonged to 
the Soviet Union. The same is true for Ireland, where Muslims come from Malaysia, 
Somalia, South Africa, Nigeria, Algeria, Libya, Bosnia and Pakistan. Greece has a 
moderately diverse Muslim population: while native Muslims are of Turkish, Roma 
and Pomak ethnicity, immigrant Muslims are of Pakistani, Bangladeshi, Afghan 
and Somali origin.
The definition of the “Muslim problem” as essentially one of a radical (fundamentalist) 
religion and a culture incompatible with Western values also obscures in Germany 
(but also in Denmark, Sweden, the Netherlands, the UK and France) the socio-
economic dimension of Muslim marginalisation. The poor educational attainment 
of Turkish and Moroccan children in France, the Netherlands, Germany and 
Denmark, or of Bangladeshi and Pakistani children in Britain (documented 
in numerous studies) has a lot to do with their socio-economic background 
(profession and schooling of parents, socio-economic level, area of residence) but 
also with the discrimination that they face at schools and later in the labour market. 
Indeed, ambitious studies such as the well-known book by Anthony Heath and 
Sin Yi Cheung,10 find it hard to explain why inequalities persist and which are the 
factors that matter most: socio-economic background, discrimination, unequal 
opportunities, religion, specific ethnic background, structure of the educational 
system, or indeed a variable combination of all these factors.
In Denmark, Germany, Britain, the Netherlands, Sweden and France, Muslims have 
been treated with increasing suspicion after the events of 9/11. Indeed, the rise of 
a fundamentalist international terrorism – in which only a handful of European 
Muslims were directly involved – has contributed to the stigmatisation of both 
Islam and Muslims. Social scientists have coined the terms “Islamophobia” and 
“Muslimophobia” to analyse these phenomena.11 Islamophobia is the irrational fear 
of and prejudice against Islam as a faith and a culture without any discrimination 
between different Islamic religious currents. Muslimophobia is the irrational fear 
of and prejudice against Muslims as individuals, assuming that all people who are 
nominally Muslims experience their identity and faith in the same fanatical way 
that involves, among other things, the fusion of religious and political power, the 
subjugation of women to men, and certain other customs that are incompatible with 
dominant Western values such as forced and under-age marriages, homophobia 
and anti-semitism. This post-2001 discourse overlooks the fact that some of the 
10 Anthony F. Heath and Sin Yi Cheung (eds.), Unequal Chances, cit.
11 Burak Erdenir, “Islamophobia qua racial discrimination: Muslimophobia”, in Anna 
Triandafyllidou (ed.), Muslims in 21st Century Europe, cit., p. 27-44, http://www.abgs.gov.tr/files/
di%C4%9Fer%20faydal%C4%B1%20dok%C3%BCmanlar/islamophobia_qua_racial_discrimination.
pdf.
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issues seen as emblematic of Muslim incompatibility with European secular and 
liberal democracies, notably homophobia or anti-semitism, are persisting issues of 
tension among Christian and secular majorities in these countries.
Muslimophobia and Islamophobia were initially phenomena noted in countries 
with large Muslim immigrant populations, that is, former host countries. However, 
such prejudice and irrational fear also exists in the new host countries. The case 
of Greece’s irregular migrant population that has arrived in the country since the 
late 2000s is an interesting case in point, which shows how a fundamentally socio-
economic or humanitarian problem can be framed as a question of culture and 
religion.12 Greece has an increasing Muslim immigrant population, which was, 
however, largely invisible until 2009. The vast majority of Muslim immigrants in 
Greece were in fact of Albanian origin and hence not practising Muslims, raising 
no claims for mosques, the wearing of headscarves or religious education. For 
Albanian Muslims, faith is largely a personal and private manner and has had 
little to do with their integration into Greek, predominantly Christian Orthodox, 
society.13 The South-East Asian immigrants who arrived in Greece from the mid-
1990s were also mainly male workers who had left their families back home in 
Pakistan or Bangladesh. Hence there were no challenges of integration of Muslim 
children in schools, nor any women wearing the veil in public places (Lazarescu and 
Broersma 2010). Islam has, however, been instrumentalised, and with detrimental 
consequences, particularly by the far Right but also by conservative parties, as part 
of the irregular migration crisis.14
3. Distinguishing between problems of integration and jihadist 
terrorism
As argued above, Muslim populations in Europe face important socio-economic 
and cultural integration challenges. However, these should not be conceived 
as a generalised malaise that translates into widespread radicalisation. First, 
radicalisation has specific features that do not concern all migrant youths who 
faces identity or employment challenges. Second, linking global geopolitical and 
largely symbolic issues with real-life problems of social acceptance, respect and 
discrimination in the labour market, is counterproductive for understanding and 
addressing these issues.
12 Anna Triandafyllidou and Hara Kouki, “Muslim Immigrants and the Greek Nation: The 
Emergence of Nationalist Intolerance”, in Ethnicities, Vol. 13, No. 6 (December 2013), p. 709-728.
13 Ifigenia Kokkali, “Being Albanian in Greece or Elsewhere. Negotiating the (National) Self 
in a Migration Context”, in Fotini Tsibiridou & Nikitas Poulantzas (eds.), Myths of the Other in 
the Balkans. Representations, Social Practices and Performances, Thessaloniki, Via Egnatia 
Foundation, 2013, p. 197-209, http://www.viaegnatiafoundation.eu/index.php/publications/myths-
of-the-other.
14 Anna Triandafyllidou and Hara Kouki, “Naturalizing Racism in the Center of Athens in May 
2011: Lessons from Greece”, in Journal of Immigrant and Refugee Studies, Vol. 12, No. 4 (2014), p. 
418-436.
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The problem with the fight against radicalisation and jihadist terrorism is 
twofold. On the one hand, we risk throwing out the baby with the bathwater: by 
concentrating on the handful of those who find an existential escape through 
espousing a particular understanding of Islam proposed by ISIS and its followers 
we risk suspecting, excluding, securitising the integration challenges that a vast 
number of Muslim youth faces in different European countries, challenges that 
have little to do with the religion itself and certainly even less to do with these 
youngsters’ and their parents’ countries of origin. On the other hand, of course 
we need to better understand the process of radicalisation that leads to extremist 
violence.
Emerson has distinguished between three forms of radicalisation emerging 
in Europe in the post 9/11 context:15 the first is of political-religious inspiration; 
its jihadist views are based on varied interpretations of Islamic texts that are 
presumed to call for a global violent jihad aiming to overthrow secular or at least 
non-Islamic regimes. A second type of radicalisation is predominantly religious 
but not political, inspired by theology and often acting as the breeding ground for 
the more radicalised violent trends outlined in the first type. This form of religious 
radicalisation may also involve more intimate forms of violence that relate to the 
family sphere, such as honour killings or the practice of female genital mutilation. A 
third type of radicalisation of both attitudes and behaviour is more closely linked to 
urban problems and socio-economic grievances faced by second-generation youth. 
Islam provides for a uniting umbrella for different ethnic groups. While grievances 
may concern poor housing, widespread unemployment and school failure, they 
may break out to take the form of violent unrest and political radicalisation verging 
towards the first or second types outlined above.
An important challenge in the fight against radicalisation is that we risk confusing 
global geopolitical challenges with local integration tensions. One of the lessons 
that have been learnt after 9/11 is that sometimes political discourses and policy 
measures overlap with one another, even if there is hardly any relationship between 
the two. Thus in the early 2000s the post 9/11 shock led to harsher controls over 
irregular migration and an overall securitisation of labour migration management 
while the perpetrators of international terrorist acts were not to be found among 
the poor and relatively low-skilled irregular migrant workers trying to enter Europe 
or North America. Indeed, the terrorists involved in the 9/11 events and in the Al 
Qaeda networks in Germany, Britain, Italy and other European countries were 
to be found among the well-educated and highly skilled migrants (and second-
generation populations) that in both Europe and North America were competing 
to attract recruits at the time.16
15 Michael Emerson (ed.), Ethno-religious Conflict in Europe. Typologies of Radicalisation in 
Europe’s Muslim Communities, Brussels, Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), 2009, p. 3-4, 
http://www.ceps.eu/node/1622.
16 See also Bill Jordan, Bo Stråth and Anna Triandafyllidou, “Contextualising Immigration Policy 
Implementation in Europe”, in Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, Vol. 29, No. 2 (March 2003), 
p. 195-224.
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Just like the 9/11 the terrorists were not to be found among the irregular migrants 
fleeing their countries in search of a better future, today’s foreign fighters and 
extremists are not to be found among the vast majority of practising young 
Muslims who face school failure or unemployment or overall discrimination and 
prejudice in their European homelands. The motivations and social mechanisms 
through which these young people become foreign fighters in Syria or get involved 
in international terrorism conspiracies have more to do with a post-modern youth 
malaise that finds its expression through religious terrorism.
Olivier Roy has been theorising on the potential of Islamic terrorism for over a 
decade17 but he has also written extensively in response to the Charlie Hebdo events:
the radicalized young people are in no way the vanguard or the 
spokesmen of the Muslim population, and in particular, that there is 
no “Muslim community” in France. Radicalized young people, who rely 
heavily on an imagined Muslim politics (the Ummah of earlier times) 
are deliberately at odds with the Islam of their parents, as well as Muslim 
culture overall. They invent an Islam which opposes itself to the West. 
They come from the periphery of the Muslim word. They are moved 
to action by the displays of violence in the media of Western culture. 
They embody a generational rupture (parents now call the police when 
their children leave for Syria), and they are not involved with the local 
religious community and the neighborhood mosques. These young 
people practice self-radicalization on the Internet, searching for a global 
jihad. They are not interested in the tangible concerns of the Muslim 
world, such as Palestine. In short, they are not seeking the Islamization 
of the society in which they live but the realization of their sick fantasy 
of heroism (“We have avenged the Prophet Muhammad,” claimed some 
of the killers at Charlie Hebdo).18
Roy points to a very interesting and relatively new phenomenon: the intertwining 
of local challenges of socio-economic integration with global geopolitical issues, 
which actually appears to be an offspring of the urban violent radicalisation that 
Emerson and co-authors observed in 2009.19 This new tendency, however, is 
now exacerbated and taken to new heights. There seems to be a tension between 
an increasingly interconnected world (through information technologies and 
cheap transport) and locally/nationally rooted integration processes. Local socio-
economic grievances and the marginalisation of second-generation migrant youth 
thus are projected as localised expressions of global discourses of the “clash of 
civilisations” type. Marginalised youth is drawn into jihadist terrorism or far right-
wing extremism and racism as local tensions or inequalities are interpreted with a 
17 Olivier Roy, “EuroIslam. The Jihad within?”, in The National Interest, No. 71 (Spring 2003), p. 63-
73.
18 Olivier Roy, “There Are More French Muslims Working for French Security Than for Al Qaeda”, in 
The World Post, 1 September 2015, http://huff.to/1xNyl7b.
19 See Michael Emerson (ed.), Ethno-religious Conflict in Europe, cit.
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global inequality lens. The role of information and communication technology is 
also important here, as it allows for a global “performance” of young people’s unease, 
disillusionment and radical, indeed terrorist, choices.20 Facebook announcements 
of becoming a jihadist fighter (or fighter’s wife), a level of public performativity and 
a new type of “the whole world is watching” (to paraphrase Todd Gitlin21) is at play 
here and becomes a catalyst for our way of thinking of local tensions and national 
policies.
Historical analysis would be of great use here too: to what extent are such lone 
idealist fighters similar to the Philhellenes of the Lord Byron and Garibaldi type 
national independence fighters of the 19th century? Is their readiness to die for an 
ideal, spiritual cause radically different from the Western left-wing terrorists of the 
1970s such as the Baader Meinhof in Germany or the Brigate Rosse in Italy? We are 
in dire need of more detailed analysis of their recruitment processes and pathways 
for converting a disenchanted unemployed young person into a jihadist fighter. 
Donatella Della Porta’s work on the Red Brigades22 is illuminating with regard to 
left-wing terrorism: can it help us also to understand today’s resurgence of this 
time international political terrorism?
Today, geopolitics have taken up stronger religious and cultural connotations 
(such as those of the “War on Terror” or the overall Islamophobia discourses 
erupting in different places in Europe) than ever before. Indeed, in the mid-1980s 
the Rushdie affair in Britain caused both internal and international upheaval 
and led to Ayatollah Khomeini issued a fatwa against the writer because of his 
blasphemous novel, Satanic Verses. However the connection at that time between 
global geopolitics and domestic politics around Muslim integration was much 
more tenuous, and therefore seen as exceptional, than the level it has achieved in 
the post 9/11 period where it has been seen as dominant in the overall debate about 
Muslim integration. Addressing these challenges today requires acknowledging 
this reciprocal projection of the local and the global which appear to feed on one 
another, usually with detrimental results for tolerance and respect.
Conclusions
European public opinion and political leaders, squeezed by a chain of problems 
– notably a fragile recovery from a six-year financial and economic crisis, an 
imploding Middle East and political unrest and instability across several Arab 
20 Olivier Roy, “Al-Qaeda in the West as a Youth Movement: The Power of a Narrative”, in Michael 
Emerson (ed.), Ethno-religious Conflict in Europe, cit., p. 11-26; Olivier Roy, “There Are More French 
Muslims Working for French Security Than for Al Qaeda”, cit.
21 Todd Gitlin, The Whole World is Watching. Mass Media in the Making and Unmaking of the New 
Left, 2nd edn, Berkeley, University of California Press, 2003.
22 Donatella Della Porta, “Recruitment Processes in Clandestine Political Organizations: Italian 
Left-Wing Terrorism”, in International Social Movement Research, Vol. 1 (1988), p. 155-189, http://
isites.harvard.edu/fs/docs/icb.topic1458086.files/Porta_recruitment.pdf.
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countries, important pressures of labour migration from Asia and Africa, and the 
persistent challenge of the socio-cultural integration of migrants and minorities 
– are tempted to put all eggs into one basket and fit the different challenges into 
a one-size-fits-all explanation based on a presumed “clash of civilisations” (to use 
Huntington’s (in)famous term). Yet the threat takes on different forms: it is a cultural 
invasion from within, a terrorist network creeping into society, a geopolitical 
invasion from outside as announced by ISIS with its terrorist attacks in Tunisia or 
Egypt. In short, the different types of migrant communities or population flows are 
conflated to create one common perception and profile of threat and danger.
A local and informed focus on local and national problems and tensions of 
integration would be far more beneficial for addressing the poor educational 
attainment or labour market insertion of Muslim or other immigrant youth in 
many European countries, while security and terrorism challenges should remain 
within the realm of international affairs, rather than being conflated and projected 
into some sort of “evil” Muslim or “enemy within.” Already 15 years after 9/11 we 
should not conflate current issues with entirely different problems.
Several stakeholders can play a positive role in helping to disentangle jihadist 
terrorism and security issues from socio-economic integration and cultural 
acceptance challenges:
• The media have an important role to play in leading a debate that is informed 
by serious analysis of the jihadist terrorism phenomenon as one of recruitment 
of marginalised youth to terrorism rather than as one linked to Muslim 
communities’ (failed) integration into European societies.
• Likewise the media need to discuss the root causes of Muslim socio-economic 
inclusion by giving voice to all parties involved – recent research (see the 
MEDIVA project23) has shown that migrants’ and ethnic minorities’ voices are 
often unheard, not even on issues of their direct concern.
• Policy makers, particularly at the local level, need to listen carefully to the 
challenges that marginalised youth face in local communities: research has 
shown that policy makers tend to underestimate the challenges faced by Muslim 
populations, particularly after 9/11, in terms of being treated as the “enemy 
within.”24
• Educators, social workers and employment officers need to work more closely 
with migrant and minority youth to prevent radicalisation and terrorism 
becoming the only seemingly successful way out of a personal socio-economic 
and identity impasse.
Updated 18 May 2015
23 For more information see: http://www.eui.eu/Projects/MEDIVA.
24 Jocelyne Cesari, “The Securitisation of Islam in Europe”, in CEPS Challenge Papers, No. 15 (April 
2009), http://aei.pitt.edu/10763.
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